Why the Renaming of the US Department of War Matters

15 Sept

By Alex Alfirraz Scheers

“What’s in a name?” asked Juliet, in William Shakespeare’s classic tragedy “Romeo and Juliet.” It turns out, quite a lot – especially in the case of the United States’ rebranding of the Department of Defense to the Department of War. “Words matter,” stated the newly appointed Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the announcement ceremony in the Oval Office. He’s right. The decision to rename the Department of Defense is another worrying sign that the Trump administration is shifting its military strategy away from deterrence, and toward warfighting and war winning. The Trump administration is reorienting U.S. military posture to settle disputes through the violent use of force. Don’t just take my word for it. “This name change is not just about renaming,” stated Hegseth, “it’s about restoring. The War Department is going to fight to win, not to lose. We’re going to go on offense, not just defense. Maximum lethality, not tepid legality.”

This statement of intent could be a game changer for the manner in which the United States approaches its nuclear strategy. With 3,700 nuclear warheads, the United States has the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal in the world. This administration’s push to incorporate a warfighting posture in its nuclear strategy will lower the threshold for nuclear use in a conflict or crisis scenario, thus increasing the likelihood of direct nuclear conflict. This will intensify a sense of insecurity in Beijing and Moscow, at a time when Washington should be inspiring a sense of restraint and caution in its adversaries.

The more provocatively Washington behaves, the more likely it is that Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China will undertake more dangerous forms of action to counteract their growing threat perceptions. The optics of this rebrand bode badly for the future of peace.

The decision to rename the Department of Defense comes nine months into an administration that has already done much damage to global stability. In January, Trump resumed the Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear program, known as SLCM-N. Canceled under the Biden administration, the program is a costly initiative to develop short-range tactical nuclear missiles that can be launched from U.S. undersea assets deployed close to adversary territory. The missiles make the United States more reliant on tactical nuclear weapons and reduce the role of conventional weapons, thus limiting the possibility of responding to acts of aggression without provoking a nuclear escalation in theaters such as the Indo-Pacific or the Euro-Atlantic.

Then, in March, Trump announced a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet, the F-47, named after himself – the 47th U.S. president. As a tactical air-based delivery platform, it is slated to be able to carry hypersonic missiles and to be employed in a warfighting theater. As a direct replacement for the nuclear capable F-22, it will most likely also be capable of carrying tactical nuclear bombs such as the low yield B-61.

The United States is investing heavily in replacing, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. According to the Arms Control Association‘s calculations, the nuclear force modernization program will cost an eye-watering $1.5 trillion in total. This scale of investment could be worth it if it guaranteed greater security. Instead, it will simply fuel an arms race that will lead to greater instability.

The restoration of a Department of War, along with the fielding of new, more lethal tactical nuclear weapons, will alter Xi and Putin’s strategic calculus to the detriment of strategic stability. To them, that U.S. nuclear capable assets are ready to strike within close distance of Chinese or Russian territory poses a direct threat to vital interests. In this dynamic, they might reason that it’s better to escalate crises rather than wait to be attacked.

Unlike China, the United States does not adhere to a No First Use policy. From the Chinese standpoint, there is no reason to believe the United States would not use nuclear weapons first. There are already doubts as to whether China will continue to adhere to No First Use. If Beijing decides that the risks of being on the receiving end of a nuclear first strike are too great, Xi and his top military brass may contemplate the pre-emptive first use of nuclear weapons against U.S. targets.

Some Republican-leaning nuclear scholars have even advocated for the pre-emptive use of nuclear force in a crisis. In his book “The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy,” Matthew Kroenig stated, “It is possible that a U.S. counterforce strike on China’s nuclear forces at present could succeed in disarming China’s entire ICBM force… if the United States can succeed in a disarming first strike against China, then it can completely limit damage to itself in the event of a nuclear war.” For Kroenig, the role of nuclear weapons is to enhance the chances of winning wars, not of preventing them. This logic contradicts the first principle of nuclear deterrence, which posits that nuclear wars cannot be won and should never be fought.

Based on a simulation I ran of the effects of a nuclear conflict between the United States and China, the latter is currently capable of holding 155 U.S. cities at risk, with a combined population of 72,697,923 civilians. Even if one Chinese nuclear weapon was able to penetrate U.S. defenses, the damage inflicted in terms of deaths would be devastating.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, the renown nuclear deterrence theorist Bernard Brodie wrote, “Thus far the chief purpose of the military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them”” By undertaking measures to increase the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and shift its nuclear strategy away from deterrence, the Trump administration is reverting back to a doctrine that might have worked in the pre-nuclear age but would precipitate Armageddon today.

The Department of War was first renamed the Department of Defense in 1949 to reflect the demands of modern conflict. “Modern war demanded unified command across land, sea, and air, as well as permanent readiness in an age of nuclear weapons,” wrote RUSI’s Dr. Walter Ladwig. “‘Defense’ captured the reality of America’s new role: a permanent guarantor of security.”

What the last nine months have shown is that the United States cannot be relied on to provide security. Instead, under Trump, it has become a driving force for instability. The strategy of deterrence and alliance-building that has helped maintain relative peace for the last eight decades is now unravelling.

Shakespeare had something to say about that, too. “Violent delights,” he wrote in “Romeo and Juliet,” “have violent ends.”

This article was published in The Diplomat on September 15, 2025.