The world goes nuclear: Countries that are next in line to arm themselves with nukes
The international arms control regime is in freefall. Existing nuclear treaties are either outdated, expiring, or unratified. Coupled with intensifying tensions in global geopolitics, countries like Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are seriously considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
In the Middle East, the Iranian proliferation risk persists. Iran continues to be an antagonistic and destabilising force in the region, and has yet to fully abandon its atomic aspirations, despite the United States’ attack on its nuclear facilities in June 2025. Meanwhile, the threat landscape in East Asia is worsening. As the global security environment becomes more dangerous, the big question remains: who will be next to go nuclear?
The Middle East
Iran
Iran poses the greatest non-nuclear threat to global security. Tehran continues to offer economic, political and military support to bad actors in the Middle East such as Hamas, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and other Islamist groups that sow havoc and terrorise civilian populations.
Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, there is a high probability that it would use them in anger against its enemies. As the Ayatollah Khamenei has said, ‘there is only one solution to the Middle East problem, namely the annihilation and destruction of the Zionist state.’
Iran already possesses dual-capable missiles. The Shahab-3 can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. Other ballistic missile capabilities, such as the Sejjil medium range ballistic missile can also carry nuclear payloads, and the Simorgh Space Launch Vehicle is an intercontinental ballistic missile that can strike cities as far as London, Paris or Berlin. Iran’s nuclear-capable missiles expose a desire to possess nuclear weapons.
Besides its missiles capabilities, Iran has aggressively pursued developing weapons grade fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium. Multilateral agreements designed to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons no longer stand in its way. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, sought to curb Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. It expired in October 2025. There is currently no tangible framework in its place.
The American bombings on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June, known as Operation Midnight Hammer, brought the threat of regime destruction uncomfortably close to home. For the Iranian leadership, survival is what’s at stake. The regime is showing all the signs of paranoia that come with existential fear.
A purge of individuals suspected of collaborating with the American and Israeli governments is already taking place. According to the Iran Human Rights group, Iran has executed at least 1000 people since the United States struck Iran’s main nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivering a speech after Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear sites
The number of executions is more than at any time in the preceding three decades. The executions indicate that Iran is eliminating the internal elements the regime deems as potentially disruptive to the future of its nuclear program.
Other tell-tale signs that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear aspirations are there. Satellite imagery captured by Vantor, a spatial intelligence company, revealed that Iran has stepped up construction at Pickaxe Mountain, the location of a centrifuge assembly hall designed for uranium enrichment buried under hard rock. Pickaxe Mountain is a short distance away from Natanz.
According to the Center for International and Strategic Studies, a defence and security think tank based in Washington, DC, ‘the construction of a large underground facility just one mile south of Natanz is highly suspicious.’
‘Iran may be pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment facility at Pickaxe Mountain, with the hopes that this facility could enrich Iran’s existing stockpile of 400kg of 60 percent enriched uranium,’ write nuclear experts Joseph Rodgers and Joseph Bermudez.
There is a simple solution to debunking these suspicions: allow inspectors to assess the site. Alas, Tehran has banned the International Atomic and Energy Agency, the United Nation’s nuclear watchdog, from gaining access on the ground, fuelling further concerns that Iran is undertaking efforts to resume its nuclear weaponisation program.
Contrary to its objectives, Midnight Hammer may well have forced Iran to more assertively pursue a viable nuclear deterrent. As nuclear diplomacy is on the wane, the rationale to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability seems to have only grown in salience in the minds of Iranian leaders.
Saudi Arabia
The spectre of Iranian nuclear proliferation haunts Saudi Arabia’s strategic outlook and directly impacts the Kingdom’s thinking on the merits of nuclear weapons acquisition. The two countries are locked in a bitter and enduring rivalry in the battle for regional hegemony.
Competing religious ideologies—Iran is a Shiite state while the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is Sunni—fuels the enmity between the countries. Sectarian proxy wars between the two countries have taken place in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
All too aware of the threat Iran’s missiles pose to Saudi Arabia, crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman, known as MBS, has expressed an interest in developing nuclear weapons in order to deter Iran. In the past, MBS has made it very clear that if Iran acquired a nuclear bomb, the Saudi’s ‘would have to get one’ too.
MBS has maintained this position since 2018, and Saudi Arabia’s history of involvement in the nuclear weapons enterprise dates back to at least the 1970s. Pakistan, a nuclear power with close diplomatic and defence ties to the Saudis, received help from Riyadh in developing its own nuclear capabilities.
As Vikram Sood, the former head of Indian intelligence, has stated, ‘the role Saudi Arabia [played] in the early years in the development of the Pakistan bomb in the 1970s is well known.’
During his recent visit to Washington, MBS negotiated a civilian nuclear energy deal with the United States. The 123 agreement established between Washington and Riyadh paves the way for the American export of nuclear reactors, fuel and nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia.
As the ink dries on the recent Saudi-US nuclear cooperation agreement, Riyadh could soon acquire a breakout capability. The Kingdom already has the technological knowledge to develop an atomic bomb, and it will soon receive the infrastructure needed to weaponise a nuclear program in the future.
‘The United States and American companies,’ states the agreement, ‘will be [Saudi Arabia’s] civil nuclear cooperation partners of choice,’ but with one crucial caveat. Riyadh will have to adhere to ‘strong non-proliferation standards.’
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman was in the White House in November 2025 to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Trump administration
Indeed, the United States has expressed concerns about Saudi breakout capabilities in the past and have stressed that enriching uranium would constitute a red line. ‘To limit proliferation risks,’ wrote Emily Day, a defence researcher, ‘Washington continues to insist on the “gold standard”, which prohibits enrichment and reprocessing.’
The United States’ plan to deploy microreactor nuclear power plants in the Middle Eastern state will not be operable until September 2028. However, Saudi Arabia could still turn to Pakistan for nuclear assistance. If signs emerge that Iran is inching closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb, Riyad could choose to purchase missiles mated with nuclear warheads from Islamabad.
‘Pakistan could provide [Saudi Arabia] the Shaheen-III over time to be comingled with Chinese intermediate range ballistic missiles,’ wrote Peter Wilson, a RAND defence analyst. ‘It is plausible that the Pakistanis would mate their nuclear warheads to their missiles rather than try to modify a similar but distinct Chinese missile.’
For the time being, the path toward a Saudi nuclear bomb is fraught with pitfalls. Saudi Arabia has exerted tremendous diplomatic energy toward modernising and detoxifying its image. Acquiring a nuclear weapon would undermine MBS’ Vision 2030 initiative, which seeks to make Saudi Arabia an attractive tourist destination and global technological and economic hub.
However, should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, all bets would be off, and a Saudi bomb would become a high-risk possibility.
East Asia
Japan and South Korea
The next nuclear weapons state could also come from Asia, as the regional security landscape deteriorates. The situation in East Asia is dangerous for several reasons.
First, the Asia-Pacific is the most nuclearised region in the world. Including India and Pakistan, there are six nuclear weapons states with both territory and important strategic interests operating in the Asia-Pacific.
The three great nuclear nations China, Russia and the United States are actively competing for dominance in the region. And North Korea is a rogue state that routinely conducts missile tests in the East Sea. North Korea last conducted a nuclear test relatively recently, back in 2017, and has threatened to resume nuclear tests in the imminent future.
Second, China has exponentially increased its nuclear weapons capabilities since Xi Jinping took power in 2012. When President Xi took over, China had 250 nuclear warheads. It now has 600, and is estimated to have 1500 by 2035, according to the Pentagon. China’s nuclear expansion program shows no signs of abating anytime soon.
In a bid to enhance the survivability of its nuclear deterrent, China’s Jin-class nuclear submarines conduct continuous at-sea deterrence patrols. Enhancing survivability better enables China to conduct retaliatory nuclear strikes in the event of a nuclear attack being visited upon the country.
This capability is known as a second-strike capability and is the bedrock of the situation known as mutual assured destruction, or MAD. MAD describes a situation in which two adversaries are able to absorb a first nuclear strike and retaliate in kind with a nuclear strike of their own.
Third, there are growing concerns over Chinese designs over Taiwan, with President Xi ordering his military to be ready and able to seize the island across the Taiwan Strait by 2027.
This troubling combination of factors indicates that the next global war is likely to start in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, Japan and South Korea have good reasons to want to acquire a credible deterrent and are regional frontrunners in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
North Korea tested an intermediate range hypersonic missile in early 2025
As Bilahari Kausikan starkly put it, ‘it is no longer a question of if but when Japan and South Korea will acquire independent nuclear deterrents within the US alliance system.’
Since 1967, Japan has adhered to three non-nuclear principles: non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, is no fan of Japan’s three-no’s doctrine, and has indicated that her administration will undertake a review of its merits.
For Takaichi, the doctrine is counterproductive and unrealistic. The only thing standing in her way is Japanese public opinion, which would rather see the land of the rising sun join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), something Takaichi has dismissed.
‘Several opinion polls show that 60-70 percent of the public believe that Japan should join the TPNW’, write Akira Kawasaki and Keiko Nakamura, nuclear politics analysts from the Asia Pacific Leadership Network. But Takaichi is adamant. For her, bolstering defences is of paramount importance. The new leader understands the language of power in this emerging security dynamic.
In a demonstration of her hard realist credo, she stated that ‘the United States may need to bring nuclear weapons into Japan to deter rivals.’ If Japan cannot become the tenth nuclear state, it will at least host American nuclear weapons on its soil for the first time since 1972.
On this, Takaichi has the public’s blessing: 60 percent of Japanese public opinion is on her side and agree that coming under the United States’ nuclear umbrella is expedient.
However, acquiring an independent capability is not out of arms reach. All the ingredients are there for Japan to rapidly develop nuclear weapons. It has all the necessary infrastructure and a booming industrial base. It simply lacks the delivery platforms, but this can be quickly remedied.
Affirming Japan’s technological and technical efficiency, Ed Naito, a Japanese commentator, stated, ‘Japan has advanced machining and manufacturing capabilities, enabling it to produce weapon components and a range of potential delivery systems such as intermediate-range missiles, ships, submarines and aircraft.’
Japan also has large stockpiles of plutonium, which can be used to produce nuclear warheads. According to Neito, if Japan enriched its plutonium stockpiles, it would have enough to ‘build 1000 bombs.’ All that is required is for the public to give the go-ahead.
Across the Sea of Japan, the equation is inverted. The South Korean public’s appetite for a nuclear weapon is growing. 70 percent of the public wants to see South Korea go full steam ahead with the acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent. Yet, the political will to do so appears to be lacking.
President Lee Jae-myung, a progressive, is resistant to the idea, calling it ‘impossible’ and fears that it would lead to a backlash. ‘There are worries about nuclear armament,’ stated Jae-myung, ‘if we were to go nuclear, it would be impossible to gain the approval of the United States or the international community.’
To placate his electorate, he cites the risk of incurring economic and diplomatic sanctions should South Korea go nuclear. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun went further and suggested that South Korea would ‘become a second North Korea,’ a compelling, albeit rhetorical, political point.
The Era of Non-Proliferation is Over
‘The era of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world,’ stated Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, ‘is coming to an end.’ The global inventory, held by nine nuclear weapons state, numbers at 12,241 warheads. That number is growing.
China, Russia and the United States are increasing their arsenals in a bid to bolster deterrence and gain a strategic edge. Many non-nuclear countries are caught in the crosshairs of great power competition. As such, they calculate that acquiring nuclear capabilities may help them gain a greater sense of independence and enhances their ability to defend themselves. This is especially true of Japan and South Korea.
This does not bode well for the future of strategic stability: the more nuclear weapons there are, the less stable the world becomes. With more nuclear weapons states, comes the heightened risk of nuclear war.
An unabridged version of this article was published in The Daily Mail on December 13, 2025.
